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INTRODUCTION

Kang et al.'s Self-Surveillance Privacy ("SSP ") is timely, important, and
correct: self-surveillance is both increasing and a potential threat to privacy.
In this brief response essay I first highlight the significant contributions in
SSP, particularly the novel conception of "flow" as a privacy metric and the
focus throughout on the growing phenomenon of self-surveillance. I tie
SSPs idea of the "data vault" to what I have elsewhere labeled the "personal
prospectus" and agree that self-aggregated information is an increasingly
important privacy concern.
At the same time, I raise three complications. First, although SSP tries to
distinguish self-surveillance technologies from third-party-privacy problems,3
I argue that the distinction is unlikely to be so clean in practice. Selfsurveillance technologies are generally consumer products encumbered by
contractual arrangements that give their makers access to the data those
products generate. Although SSP relies on the first-party/third-party
distinction to assert that in self-surveillance only the individual user has a
claim to ownership of the underlying data, in many consumer contexts this
is not the case. Particularly when a hardware product is sold at a discount or
a loss to drive users into profitable long-term service agreements, SSPs
distinction seems inadequate.4
Second, even assuming that one could implement the SSP proposal and
sequester self-surveillance data in a secure, privileged data vault, there would
still be pressure on consumers to release the data into the economy. This is
the unraveling problem for privacy-that giving a consumer control over
her data is not necessarily sufficient to prevent the consumer from feeling
forced to reveal that data.5
Given these concerns, this response essay ends with a question: rather
than introducing privacy agents, should we perhaps instead regulate firms
that deal in self-surveillance data as privacy intermediaries? We may be
stuck with an architecture in which firms collect self-surveillance data for
consumers and use the data in various ways, including in marketing or other
transactions that may or may not always be in the consumer's best interest.
How should such firms be regulated to protect consumers? This may,
ultimately, be the route we must take, despite the fact that it is-as SSP
acknowledges-a harder nut to crack.

1. Jerry Kang et al., Selg'Smeillanceltivacy, 97 IowAL. REV.
2.

DisclosureFuture,105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 153,

3.
4.
5.
6.

809 (2012).

See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling 1ivay: The 1ersonal 1'opec/us and the Threat ( a 1dl-

i 166

SeeKang et al., sufna note 1, at 825-26.
Se ia Part II.A.
See inl Part II.B.
See

min

Part II.C.

(201

1) (explaining

the personal prospectus).
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Before we start, one caveat. Because of the very short format of this
response, I have avoided describing SSPs argument except where absolutely
necessary; I assume the reader is familiar. Similarly, I make no attempt here
to review comprehensively each aspect of the essay. Instead, I focus on a few
interesting bits and raise questions and concerns to provoke further
discussion of this valuable addition to the privacy literature.
.

YES ...

A. SFLF-MFASUTRFMFNT & TIF INCRFASJNG IMPORTAN CFOF
TJJF PFRSONAL PROSPFCTUS

SSP makes one assertion about which there should be no debate:
human instrumentation is booming. A Fitbit monitor can track the number
of steps you take in a day, how many miles you've walked, calories burned,
and how many minutes you have slept.' BodyMedia's armbands are similar,
as is the Philips DirectLife device' and the Nike Fuel Band.o You can track
your running habits with RunKeeper," your weight and body fat with a WiFienabled

scale,I2

your

blood

pressure

with

a wireless

blood

pressure

monitor,13 or your emotional arousal with an Affectiva Q Sensor.'i You can
monitor your sleep with a Zeols or SleepTracker device,6 your pulse and
temperature with a Basis sports watch,; your heart rate with your iPhone
and a Bluetooth-enabled Wahoo heart rate monitor," your diabetes
management with the iBGStar iPhone add-on and app,,' your alcohol intake

7.

See Piti/ 11tra Overview, FITBIT, http: //wwA.fitbit.con /product

(last visited July 8,

20112).

8.
See What Is BodyMedia FIT?, BoDvMEDIA, http://mN.bodynedia.com/Products/LearnMore /What-is-BodyMedia-FIT (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
9.

See DirecLife, PHILIPS DIRECTLIFE, http://iwwy.directlife.philips.con

(last visitedJuly 8,

240 1!2).

to.

See Nike+ Fuelband,NIKE, http://vxv.nike.con/fuelband (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

ii.

See RU NKEEPER, http://wwy.runkeeper.con (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

1 2.

See Fitbit Aria Overview, FITBIT, http://wiv.fitbit.coin/product/aria (last visited July 8,
(last visited July
201 2); The Jntelligent Scale, WItIIINGS, http://Nw.withings.com/en/bodyscale
8, 2012).

See IHEALTH, http://iwwy.ihealthgg.com/BP 3 feature.htnl (last visited July 28, 2o2);
13.
Bod Pressure Monitor, WIIIINGS, http://Nw.withings.com/en/bloodpressurenonitor (last visited
July 8, 2012).
14.
15.

i6.

QSensot, AFFECTIVA, http://mmv.affectiva.com/q-sensor (last visitedJuly 8, 201!2).
See ZEO, http://ww.ynyyzeo.com/sleep (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
See SLEEPTRACKER, http: //wwv.sleeptracker.con (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
See

See Basis Product Tour, BASIS, http://m.nybasis.cor/product/#/tech
17.
July 8, 2012).
18.

SeeWAIIOOFITNESS, http://mwahoofitness.con

(lastvisitedJuly 8, 201!2).

See The iBGSlar Diabeles Managet Applicaltion, IBGSTAR, http://mw
app.aspx (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
19.

(last visited

.ibgstar.us/iphone-

80o
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with Drinking Diary,-o your jogging with Smashrun,, your sexual history
with BedPost,2 your driving habits with CarChip,4 your energy use with
Wattvision, 4 the music you listen to with Last.fm,5 and your movements and
location with WhereDoYouGo, 6 Trackr!,7 or Placeme. 8 Beyond merely
recording your behavior, these technologies also seek to change it: you can
motivate yourself to exercise more, for example, by carrying a Striiv device2o
in your pocket that rewards your exertions with electronic badges and prizes.
Some call this physiological computing,3o personal informaticss1 or the
"quantified self' movementA In what I call "Generation One" of this trend,
enthusiasts have hacked together hardware and software innovations to
collect and analyze data about all facets of daily life. An inventor in England
named Dale Lane, for example, recently used a personal computer to track
his television viewing habits so that he could analyze what he and his family
watched, when, for how long, and how often.,, He then added a webenabled camera that photographed him as he watched television. Combined
with free facial-analysis software from the web service Face.com, this allowed
Lane to analyze how often he smiled while watching a particular television
program, revealing in minute detail his likes and dislikes:' Similarly, a
computer scientist named Stephen Wolfram recently published an analysis
of over twenty years of self-collected data documenting his phone call and
email habits-data he had collected using various devices and systems he
created.3
20.

See DRINKINGDIARY.COM, http://mvN.drinkingdiary.com/index.html (last visited July 8,

2012).

21.

SeeSMASHRUN, http://mw.sinashirun.coin (last visited July 8, 2012).

22.

See BEDPOSI, http://Nw.bedposted.com (last visitedJuly 8, 201!2).

23.
See CarChip Pto, CARCIIIP, http://mNv.carchip.com/Products/8226.asp
July 8, 2012).

25.

SeeWATTVISIoN, http://wvw.wattvision.con (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
SeeLAST.FM, http://wmy.last.fn (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

26.

SeeWil ERE Do YOU Go, http://Ny.wheredoyougo.net (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

24.

2401

(last visited

27.

SeeT RACKR!, http://Ny.trackr.eu (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

28.

See PLACEME, http://wwv.placemeapp.con/placene/index.htnl

(last visited July 8,

24).

29.

SeeSTRUV, http: //m.striiv. coin (last visitedJuly 8,

2012).

See Physiological Computing: Where Brain and Body Drive Technology, P1IIYSIOLOGICAL
COMPUTING, http://mww.physiologicalconputing.net (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).
30.

31.

SeeKnow Thysel, PERSONAL INFORMATICs, http://personalinfornatics.org (last visited

July 8, 2012).
See Quantified Sellf Sell Knowledge
32.
quantifiedself.con (last visitedJuly 8, 2012).

Through Numbers, QUANTIFIED

See Dale Lane, What Do I Watch on TV?, DALELANE.(O.UK,
33.
tvscrobbling (last visitedJuly 8, 201 2).
See Dale Lane, Smile!, DALELANE.CO.UK (Apr. 3,
34.
co.uk/blog/?p2o92.
35.
8,

2012),

2012,

SELF,

http://

http://dalelane.co.uk/

to:29 PM), http://dalelane.

See Stephen Wolfram, The PrsonalAnalytics ofMy Life, STEPHEN WOLFRAM BLOG (Mar.
http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2 2/o3/the-personal-analytics-of-ny-life.

PRIVACY & THE PERSONAL PROSPECTUS

2012]

81

Such data analysis is increasingly available to consumers not interested
in writing their own code or hacking their own hardware together. This is
"Generation
Two"
of
the
self-surveillance
movement-the
commercialization of self-tracking and self-surveillance sensor devices. Web
services such as Baby Connect, Total Baby, Baby Log, and Trixie Tracker, for
example, allow thousands of parents to record the sleep, eating, and
digestive habits of their newborns: since Baby Connect launched in 2oog, its
users have input over 47 million such "events."t6 New hardware products are
under development to relieve users of the need to do such input manually.:3
Although very little research exists on the prevalence of self-tracking using
Generation Two consumer products, one early study suggests that
approximately one-quarter of internet users have tracked some aspect of
their health online.
SSP is right to call attention to these new streams of personal data.
Sensors are becoming far less expensive and far more common. Consider
just today's smartphones, which now contain a compass (to detect physical
orientation), accelerometer (to track the phone's movement in space),
ambient light monitor (to adjust screen brightness), proximity sensor (to
detect whether the phone is near your face), and gyroscope (to detect the
phone's orientation vertically or horizontally), as well as GPS, a sensitive
microphone, and multiple cameras. Research is underway to further
enhance smartphones to detect ultraviolet radiation levels (to help prevent
skin cancer),;o pollution levels (to help monitor one's environment),40 and
various indicators of health, activity, and well-being,41 including sensors that
can monitor blood alcohol levels and body fat.4'

36. See Mya Frazier, The Data-Driven Parent, AFLANTIC, May 2012, at 28, available at
http: //www.theatlantic.com/nmagazine/archive/ 2012 /5/the-data-driven-parent/8935.
Evoz and Belkin, for example, are developing a Wi-Fi enabled monitoring device. See
37.
Belkin and Fvoz Join Forces To Create W-Fi Enabled Baby Monitoring Solutions, REUITERS.COM (Jan. 3,
1:59 PM), http: /wwy.reuters.com /article/ 2012 /01 /03 /idUS1508 5 0+o3-Jan-2012+
2012,
BW201oo0103.

38.
o1

1

See
(0o1

SiSANNAH
),

FOX, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE SoCLAL LIFE OF HEALTH INFORMATION,
available at http://Nwwy.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/201 I/PIP

SocialLife ofHealthInfo.pdf.
See New Sensors for Smartphones, MIT MOBILE EXPERIENCE LABORATORY, http://mobile.
39.
mit.edu/research/new-sensors-smartphones (lastvisitedJuly 8, 201!2).
40.
SeeDAVID HASENFRATZ ET AL., COMPITER ENGINEERING AND NETWORKs LABORATORY,
PARTuCIPATORY AIR POLLUTION MONITORING USING SMARTPHONES 1 (2012), available at
ftp://Nww.tik.ee.ethz.ch/pub/people/hdav id/HSSTio 2.pdf.

See, e.g., Sean T. Doherty & Paul Oh, A Multi-Sensor Monitoring System of Human
41.
Physiology and Daily Activities, 18 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH 185, 185-86 (2012) (using
smartphone along with an electrocardiogram and a blood-glucose monitor to track health and
activity).
SeeAndrew Ku, Smariphones Spotted with Btealhalyzer, Body Fat Sensots, ToM's HARDIVARE
42.
(Mar. 2, 2012, 6:oo AM), http://wiv.tonshardware.com/news/NTTidocomo-snartphonebreathalyzer-iweather-health, 14863.html.
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I have elsewhere focused on such sensor data, arguing that they offer
both the promise of self-revelation and various kinds of privacy perils.43 In
particular, I have introduced the notion that over time each of us
increasingly will have a "personal prospectus"-a compilation of an
individual's verified private information about himself or herself.4 The
personal prospectus will contain information obtained through digital
monitoring of directly observable data-this is the self-surveillance sensor
data on which SSP focuses. In addition, the personal prospectus may also
contain directly verifiable data-such as financial, educational, or criminal
records-that is accumulated in one location in verified form.45 SSP does not
focus on this second type of information, but it is as important as directly
observable sensor data. All of this information can and will be useful to
individuals as they attempt to assert themselves in the economy by signaling
their qualities to other economic actors.46
At the most basic level, then, SSP deserves recognition for helping to
draw attention to this trend and to the privacy implications of sensor-based
self-surveillance data. Sensors and other monitoring devices are likely to
have far-reaching legal implications, beyond just the privacy domain, that
deserve consideration by the academic and policy communities. In the
criminal context, for example, will self-surveillance data (e.g., constant
location tracking via a smartphone's GPS records) become a standard alibi
or be used (e.g., pulse or other biometric data that tracks emotional or
physical arousal or stress) to establish mens rea? In the family law context,
will monitoring one's child via such sensors become expected and part of
the baseline standard of care? In the employment and healthcare contexts,
will employers be able to seek access to self-surveillance data (e.g., caloric
intake, exercise habits, sleep patterns) for insurance purposes or as part of a
corporate wellness program? These questions deserve study, and SSP makes
a contribution by highlighting the rise of sensor-driven monitoring.
B.

FLow

In addition, SSP tantalizes with a brief discussion of a novel conception
of privacy based on the relative "flow" of information through an
information context. The standard conception of privacy as control over
one's information has various shortcomings, which have been well thrashed
out.47 Nevertheless, many discussions of privacy ultimately return to control-

See Peppet, supra note 2, at i167-73; Scott Peppet, The Quantified Sell. Personal Choice
43.
and Privacy Problem?, CONCURRING OPINIONs (Nov. i6, 2oo, 6:28 PM), http://wvw.
concurringopinions.con/archives/20o/11/the-quantified-self-personal-choice-and-privacyproblen.htnl.
44.

See Peppet, supiranote 2, at ii66-67.

45.

Id. at 1173-76.

46.

Id.ati

47.

Id. at

7 6-82.

i 186

n.158 (citing literature that is critical of privacy as control).
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based conceptions.48 Flow seems, at first blush, to offer a different metric
that could move the conversation beyond control. SSFs authors plant a
"scholarly flag" indicating a desire to return to these questions.49 I urge them
to do so quickly.
When they do, I hope they will explore how conceiving of privacy in
terms of information flow settles or solves existing privacy problems or
debates in the informational privacy literature. In short, to what questions is
flow an answer? I can offer one: I have recently drawn attention to the
problem that "voluntary" sharing of one's information can sometimes
present a privacy issue,jo particularly in contexts in which individuals feel
pressured to reveal their private information because others have done so
and a social or economic stigma will attach if they stay quiet.a5 Control
conceptions of privacy do not properly account for this type of problem: the
orthodox response from such a point of view is that voluntary self-disclosure
presents no privacy issues so long as the consent is valid. Flow, however,
seems to fit well as an explanation for why in some contexts voluntary
disclosure may still be privacy-depleting or invasive. As Kang et al. mention,
"according to our flow conception, it doesn't matter that an individual
consents."s> The flow metric may thus provide a useful means for talking
about privacy problems in the context of "forced disclosure" or the
unraveling of privacy.
Similarly, SSTs authors may be able to connect their idea of flow to
Harry Surden's work on "structural privacy"-the ways in which certain types
of information have remained functionally private because they have
historically been difficult to gather, analyze, and store even if they were
technically public.as Court records might have always been available in the
dusty file cabinets of a county courthouse, but does this completely
eliminate any privacy issue once those records are digitized and made
available on the internet? Our traditional conceptions of privacy as control
suggest that there is no privacy problem with such frictionless access, given
that the information was always available in some form in the public domain.
But flow suggests otherwise: the harm, to the extent there is one, can be
measured by the increase in movement of these data into and across
information contexts in new ways. Again, flow may prove a useful means for
understanding certain privacy problems that have sometimes been difficult

Id. at i 185-90 (discussing the ways in which control continues to pervade privacy
48.
literature).
See Kang et al., supra note i, at 822 ("[W~e mean to plant a scholarly flag to mark
49.
further inquiry.").
at i1 83-go.

51.

See Peppet, sufna note
See infWa Part I.B.

52.

Kang et al., supranote

53.

See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privac, 6o SMU L. REv. 1605, 1613-15 (2007).

50.

2,

t,

at 822 n.33.
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to grapple with in its absence. There are undoubtedly many other points of
contact to explore;54 I will leave those for SSFs authors.

C.

PRIvAcYAGFNTS, PRIVACY VA(ITS & PRIVACYPRIVIEGF

Finally, SSP should be applauded for its focus on a structural solution to
privacy problems-changing the players, and type of players, in the mix.
Specifically, SSPs introduction of a new type of professional privacy agentthe personal data "guardian"-is a wise attempt to reengineer the problem
of self-surveillance data rather than merely argue within the constraints of
the existing structure of that problem (e.g., about whether consumers are
sufficiently informed by privacy policies, etc.).
SSPs focus on privacy-enhancing agents is noteworthy for advocating
for a new type of professional-a human being with legal obligations. Much
of the early computer science work on internet privacy focused on the use of
automated software "agents," or what Lawrence Lessig early on called the
"electronic butler."ms The core idea of such software agents was that they
would learn a user's privacy preferences and then automatically negotiate
with websites that the user visited to ensure that the sites met the user's
privacy requirements0 SSP argues for a very different approach: state
licensing of privacy agents charged with protecting their clients' data (by
securing it in privacy "vaults") and privacy preferences (by negotiating on
their clients' behalves with vendors and others interested in such data).57
All of this is laudable, although Part II raises some doubts about the
efficacy of such privacy agents.58 It is important, however, to distinguish
these two concepts-privacy agents and privacy vaults-and not to assume
that one is inextricably tied to the other. In particular, it is very helpful that
SSP focuses on privacy vaults and begins to explicate the function they could
serve. I have elsewhere argued for a similar concept, particularly the notion
that data can be processed within a privacy vault without revealing the

Another may be Julie Cohen's work on "semantic discontinuity" or the need for "gaps"
54.
in the semantic web so that individuals have some space in which to live. Seeji LIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGIRING TIIE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND TIIE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRAC IICE 223-66

(2012). Such gaps seem similar, in some ways, to conceiving of privacy in terms of slowing down
the flow of information. I thank Paul Ohm for this connection.
55.

See LAMRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE I6O (1999).

See Daniel Le M6tayer & Shara Monteleone, Automated Consen Though 1tivacy Agents:
25 COMPIT IER L. & SECU RI IY REV. 136, 140 (009)
("[A] Privacy Agent can be defined as a software system offering two essential functionalities:
(I) a User Interface dedicated to the interactions with the subject (for example to allow him to
define his 'privacy policy') and (2) a Data Manager controlling the disclosure of personal
data.").
56.

Legal Requiements and Technical Architecture,

57.
58.

See Kang et al., sufna note 1, at 828-31.
See infra Part II.A.
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ownership of those data.59 From a technical standpoint, privacy vaults make
great sense.
Privacy vaults need not, however, be administered by privacy agents with
fiduciary obligations to one client (the individual data owner). Instead,
privacy vaults might be more like trusts-administered by a trustee with
fiduciary obligations to multiple parties.co Or we may need to define a set of
legal obligations for "privacy intermediaries" that run such vaults-entities
that are clearly serving as middlemen, but in a regulated system like other
intermediaries in the economy. One might want Google and Facebook, for
example, to have certain obligations of competence and confidentiality, but
these entities are clearly not "agents" in the sense in which SSP means. The
point here is that each idea-privacy agents and privacy vaults-may have
merit, and they may indeed have merit in combination. But they should also
be fully considered in alternative configurations separate from each other.
We will return to this discussion below.6,
Finally, SSPs focus on the possibility of privileging sensitive information
to fend off a future subpoena is important and also contributes a promising
tool to the privacy literature.2 It should also, however, be separated from
the article's focus on personal data guardians and personal data vaults. If
consumers would not use self-surveillance technologies in socially optimal
ways without privilege, it might attach not only to information held in a
personal data vault but to any sensor-collected information, even if secured
elsewhere. Indeed, it is difficult to see why self-surveillance data should be
the only information protected through such a privilege, if indeed such
privileges are necessary. Why not search queries, smart phone location data,
or other sensitive digital information? SSP tantalizes by offering this limited
privilege, but the argument for legally fencing off self-surveillance
information-while leaving so many other types of personal information
unprotected-deserves further discussion. Until that point, we should
consider the potential of privileging all such information, whether or not
that protection is tied to a personal data guardian or personal data vault.
II.

BUT ...

Having celebrated some of the most foundational aspects of SSP, let us
turn to a few questions or doubts. I raise three: (1) how to address the
commercial reality that much self-surveillance will take place using

59.

See Scott R. Peppet, Smart Mortgages, Privac and the Regulatory Possibility of In/mediation

(U. Colo. Law: Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. ogat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1458064.

13,

2oog), available

6o.
See id. at 53-56 (discussing how a privacy intermediary might be best analogized to the
trustee model).
61.

See infia Part 11.C.

62.
SeeKang et al., supra note i, at 832-36 (discussing the potential evidentiary privilege
that could be granted to self-surveillance data).
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consumer products that come with contractual complications that may
undermine the personal data guardian idea; (2) how to address the
unraveling problem that self-surveillance data create; and (3) whether it
would be more effective to more heavily regulate existing "privacy
intermediaries" than to try to introduce a new species of privacy agents.

A.

Is THis RLALLYA TH1RD PARTY SUR VEILLANC PROBLEM AiILR ALL?

SSP distinguishes self-surveillance-in which an individual has control
over sensors and other devices that record data-from third-party
surveillance problems-in which a counterparty such as a merchant or
device manufacturer "collects the personal data in the course of
interacting . . . with the individual."
With

self-surveillance .

.

. the

As SSP puts it:
counterparty's

because the counterparty does not exist .

. .

interest disappears

. Rather, these data are

created by purposeful, self-initiated surveillance through sensors
within the individual's control .... Accordingly, no counterparty ...
has proprietary claim to such data; it didn't collect the data in the
first place and often couldn't . .. even if it wanted to.64
This is a critical distinction that underlies the rest of SSPs argument,
because SSP assumes for the remainder of the article that an individual can
sequester her information in a data vault through a personal data guardian
because the individual is the only party with rights to or interests in those
data.
In an academic research context-such as the Participatory Sensing
example discussed in SSP"-this lack of a third party might be descriptively
accurate. Similarly, an individual innovator or ambitious hobbyist might be
able to jerry-rig simple sensors and code the software needed to collect and
analyze the data produced by those devices. In such Generation One selfsurveillance scenarios, the individual truly is engaged in "pure" selfsurveillance without the involvement of third parties. Both Dale Lane and
Stephen Wolfram, for example, clearly had the technical skills to assemble
their own hardware and software to record and analyze their self-surveillance
6
data.
In the many Generation Two consumer examples already discussedsuch as Fitbit, DirectLife, BodyMedia, Nike's FuelBand or Striiv'7-this is
not, however, the case. Instead, a firm produces a hardware sensor that a
consumer purchases and uses subject to various terms and conditions. In
addition, these hardware components are often tied to the firm's web site or
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service for aggregating and analyzing the sensor data. A Fitbit user, for
example, can log on to Fitbit.com to see charts and graphs of her data in
action. This is the trajectory of self-surveillance at commercial scale, and it
provides manufacturers of such devices with an intimate portrait of their
users. Somewhat paradoxically, SSP is still correct to label such activity "selfsurveillance," because self-measurement does differ from the surreptitious
third-party tracking that is the focus of much internet privacy literature. At
the same time, "pure" self-surveillance without any involvement of thirdparty firms is rare.
In a footnote, SSP acknowledges that the distinction between selfsurveillance and third-party surveillance may not hold completely:
There could be gray areas. For example, what if a third party
provides an 'app' to an individual to engage in self-surveillance, but
that 'app' has terms of service that give the third party some
proprietary claim to the self-surveillance data. In this context, via a
clickwrap contract, the individual has arguably given some
proprietary claim to a third party in exchange for self-surveillance
assistance.

This

muddies

the

sharper

distinction[] .. . which

presumed that no such assistance was needed. We concede that
contracting away rights to data can always complicate the picture.68
Unfortunately, this concession seems far more important than a footnote
implies. The academic research context or isolated Generation One
hobbyist who can hack her own hardware and software together are not the
examples that matter. The fundamental question is how self-surveillance will
scale-or, more accurately, is scaling-to become widely accessible to
consumers rather than hobbyists. What business models will firms adopt to
support these sensor technologies and data analysis services? How are these
products being developed, marketed, and sold, and does that complicate
SSTs idea of introducing Personal Data Guardians to serve as privacy agents?
I believe it does. Consider just a few examples of existing consumer selfsurveillance products. In a sense, hardware manufacturers like Fitbit and
Zeo seem to be merely selling a self-surveillance device. One could imagine
such devices working with SSPs data guardian structure, because an
individual user could theoretically choose to re-route his or her Fitbit or
other data from the device to the data guardian.
In reality, however, the legal relations and economics of consumer selfsurveillance are more complex. Many existing consumer self-surveillance
products are not one-shot purchases in which the consumer buys a device
that the consumer then controls completely. Instead, the purchase of the
device itself is merely the beginning of a long-term service arrangement
between the consumer and the manufacturer, who hopes to provide data

68.

Kang et al., supra note i, at 826 n.53.
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storage and analysis services to the user. Thus, the popular Fitbit exercise
monitor, for example, costs $99.95 to purchase but an additional $49.99 per
year for "Fitbit Premium" data services./n The device synchronizes almost
automatically with Fitbit's web services once taken out of the box, and
without connection to that service, the hardware product itself is little more
than a simple pedometer. Unless a user can hack the device, which requires
some technical sophisticationo Fitbit data is not available separate from
Fitbit's online services. Likewise, the Philips Directlife device depends even
more obviously on a subscription model. The device comes bundled with a
one-year subscription for $149, and each additional year of service costs an
additional $149.7, To use the physical device-called the Activity Monitor-

users must activate an online account on the DirectLife website. Similarly,
BodyMedia's armbands-which operate much like the Fitbit and DirectLife
devices-cost $149 to purchase but $6.95 per month for a subscription to
BodyMedia's web-enabled data services."
We see this business model elsewhere. Amazon, for example, sells its
popular Kindle e-book reader at a loss because of the potential value it sees
in electronic media users purchasing from Amazon with the device.73 It is
not clear whether firms like Fitbit, DirectLife, and BodyMedia absorb a loss
on the sale of their hardware in order to secure subscriptions. It is obvious,
however, that locking users in to long-term service plans is already becoming
a dominant strategy in the self-surveillance industry.74 The Evoz infant
monitoring service, for example, is $39.99 per year; Evoz Premium, which
includes the ability to receive a message when your infant is crying, costs
$69.99 per year.75
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If a firm adopts this business model, will it be willing to work with a
Personal Data Guardian that controls a user's data? Most likely not. Doing so
would complicate the firm's strategy of providing data services to the user
over time. Although it might be possible for a firm to sell a consumer
hardware device and sell data analysis for that device without actually seeing
the data in question (because the data were locked in a data vault controlled
by a Personal Data Guardian), I predict that firms will resist this. Losing
access to their users' data would make product testing and quality control
more difficult, as well as liberate the consumer to go elsewhere for the longterm data services on which these firms seem to be betting their future.
Finally, how is a consumer holding a blood pressure monitor or other
tracking device at a Wal-Mart or an Apple store supposed to introduce a
Personal Data Guardian to the manufacturer of that device? There does not
seem to be much room for negotiation.@
Not surprisingly, these device manufacturers have begun to use their
terms of service and privacy policies to take ownership and control of the
biometric data produced through self-surveillance. Consider just one
example: the BodyMedia armband and associated "Activity Manager," which
is BodyMedia's web-based data storage and analysis service. BodyMedia's
privacy policy states that "[a] 11data collected including, but not limited to,
food logs, weight, body-fat percentage, sensor data, time recordings, and
physiological data ... are and shall remain the sole and exclusive property
of BodyMedia."77 The policy goes on to clarify that "[y]ou opt-in to
armband-data recording by voluntarily wearing the armband," and that
"[y]ou opt-in to self reporting data by voluntarily self reporting
information."78 In other words, if you use your BodyMedia armband, you
have contractually relinquished any claim to ownership of, or control over,
the data it produces. Other biometric device manufacturers take the same
approach.79
SSF's authors, of course, may argue that this kind of example proves
exactly why Personal Data Guardians are necessary. I agree that such
contracts demonstrate the need for solutions, but suggest that they also at

76. Granted, if enough consumers sought to use the Personal Data Guardian model,
perhaps market pressure would build for devices equipped to accommodate this architecture.
Given the current growth in and popularity of self-surveillance devices without such protections,
however, and the generally limited apparent demand among consumers for increased privacy
protections in other areas, this seems somewhat unlikely.
Privaq Poli, BODYMEDIA, http://www.bodymedia.com/support-help/policies/privacy77.
policy (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
Id.
For example, the Basis sports watch monitors heart rate and other biometric
79.
information. The Basis privacy policy makes clear that "[a]ll Biometric Data shall remain the
sole and exclusive property of BASIS Science, Inc.," and that "[w]e may share or sell
aggregated, de-identified Biometric Data." Basis 1'iva Polig, BASIs, http://en.mybasis.
com/ legal/ privacy (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
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least partly undermine SSFs premise that self-surveillance involves few or no
contractual or third-party complications. The reality on the ground-at least
in the Generation Two consumer context-is that self-surveillance is not
going to be so pure. Instead, I think we must face the question that SSP
deems "harder"so and thus tries to avoid: how to regulate or manage the
creation of such data when there are competing legal claims to its ownership
and use, especially when the contracts governing such claims are rarely read
or understood by consumers?I
B.

How ToPREVLNI u-HE UNRAVELIjNG OFPRIVACY?

In addition to these complications about introducing a Personal Data
Guardian, I must also question the efficacy of the Personal Data Vault.
Assume for a moment that an individual is able to use a guardian to
sequester her self-surveillance data in a secure vault. SSP seems to assume
that once such data are so secured, an individual will be free to then do what
she wishes with those data-free to keep such information concealed, on the
one hand, or to consent to its revelation, on the other.
I have recently argued at length that such consent may become illusory
in certain contexts because of the unraveling effect. Unraveling works as
follows. Imagine a pool of people, each of whom knows his or her blood
pressure but none of whom knows anyone else's blood pressure. A health
insurer offers a discount on insurance premiums if one wears a tiny patch on
one's skin that monitors one's blood pressure and wirelessly uploads that
information to the insurer daily. There is no obligation to participate-the
program is marketed as a way to save by getting a discount if your blood
pressure is particularly healthy. (One can generalize this example to any
other kind of sensor-observable health trait, such as pulse, exercise history,
miles walked or ran, etc.)
What will happen? The unraveling effect teaches that as individuals with
very good blood pressure sign up for the monitoring program in order to
get a discount, over time others with less good vital signs will increasingly
feel pressure to follow suit. If you have middling blood pressure and all
those with better health have already signed up, you will be pooled by the
insurance companies with those other non-disclosing insureds who have
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poorer health than you. You will therefore disclose, even if your physical
condition is not the very best. And so on down the line, as individuals of all
types realize that the stigma of not disclosing their characteristics has
become worse than the penalties that may attach to self-revelation of even
poor-to-middling qualities.>s
Without re-hashing this entire argument here, it suffices to say that
locking one's information in a data vault does not relieve the economic
pressure one may feel to reveal it to one's economic counterparts. Indeed,
in the consumer self-surveillance context, the tie-in to insurance has already
begun. Products like Fitbit, DirectLife, BodyMedia, Striiv, and others
produce data that is inherently valuable to health insurers, who are always
seeking new ways to more precisely track and evaluate the risk characteristics
of their insureds. Self-surveillance data is not just useful for self-awareness or
self-knowledge; it is also an extremely valuable commodity.
Some consumer self-surveillance firms are thus focusing on the
corporate or insurance tie-in as a primary source of revenue. Limeade, for
example, offers health monitoring services. Their business model is to sell
their services to employers as part of corporate wellness programs. This tie-in
to corporate wellness programs is explicit. Limeade's privacy policy provides
for sharing a user's information with "third parties who are contracted with
your employer or your health plan in order to provide disease management,
health management, behavioral coaching, or similar wellness-related
services."4 In addition, Limeade's policy states that an employer or health
plan may provide a user "with incentives and rewards for [a user's]
participation in the service."t
Philips DirectLife is likewise governed by a privacy policy providing that
"[w]here you are using DirectLife Products and/or Services as a result of
your employment or where your employer is our business partner, we may
share with your employer some of your Personal Data."( The policy then
clarifies that DirectLife will not share "activity level" data (e.g., how much
exercise you engaged in, etc.) without a user's consent, except "on an
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anonymized and aggregated basis."8 7 The policy provides for similar sharing
with a user's insurance company."
These firms are attempting to build business by offering such data to
employers and insurance companies as wellness services. In practice, this
means that employers and insurers can now offer discounts and incentives to
their employees and/or insureds for revealing self-surveillance data. Locking
these data away in a data vault may thus become extremely expensive-not
(only) because of the cost associated with paying a Personal Data Guardian
to maintain a Personal Data Vault, but because of the inherent penalties one
may begin to pay in health insurance premiums for refusing to reveal such
data. In short, it may not be worth it to try to secure such information as we
increasingly inhabit a world in which the economy demands its subsequent
revelation.
C. WIATAO TREGL ATING CONSTMFRDFViCF AAKFRS AS PRIVACY
INTFRMF)ARIFS, lR4TITFR TITAN TRYNG TO CRF.ATFNFWPRI7AcYAGFNS?

It pains me to argue that Personal Data Guardians may not work in
practice. I want them to succeed. Structural solutions like this seem to me
the best way to re-engineer the flow of personal information to secure
greater privacy. At the same time, if the two objections raised to this point
hold weight, then SSTs core prescriptions do not. We may not be able to
lock away sensor-based self-surveillance data, even if we were to create a
profession of Personal Data Guardians and a system of secure Personal Data
Vaults.
What then to do about such data? As indicated at the start, SSP is clearly
correct to draw attention to the increase in both quantity and quality of such
information. 8 9 We can now measure all sorts of biometric markers, and the
quantification of the self will only increase in sophistication.,o But it seems
that-for good or ill-the consumer devices and applications that will bring
such self-measurement to the general population will be enmeshed in a legal
and economic context far messier than that described or proposed by SSP.
Instead, we will have to continue to wrestle with the fact that much selfsurveillance data will be collected, stored, analyzed, and used not by privacy
agents, but by firms serving as intermediariesbetween the individuals using selfsurveillance sensor technologies and other economic actors-such as
advertisers, health insurers, and employers-that want and will pay for at
least some access to such data.
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Firms that collect consumers' self-surveillance data are thus akin to
Google, Facebook, and a host of other existing internet intermediaries
about which privacy scholars have begun to express doubts.9o Unlike agents,
such as SSFs Personal Data Guardians, that can have clear and unconflicted
fiduciary obligations to an individual, intermediaries present a muddier
situation. They may be obligated to their individual users, but they may be
paid by the advertisers, insurers, or others on the "other side" of the
economic transactions. They may say they wish to protect a user's privacy,
but have every incentive not to do so. And unlike SSTs proposed privacy
agents, they may not be particularly transparent about their incentives,
intentions, or conflicts.
Nevertheless, if the agency-based model proposed by SSP does not gain
traction-and, as explained, I have reason to doubt that it can-we may be
stuck with acknowledging that consumer-scale Generation Two selfsurveillance will be managed by firms serving as intermediaries instead. To
the extent one believes that greater privacy protections are needed, we may
therefore have to define the obligations of such "privacy intermediaries" in
greater detail, and begin to regulate this class of intermediaries more
heavily-as we have regulated intermediaries in the financial and other
contexts. How best to do so is a topic for another day.
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